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1 Philosophers of science have discussed the dichotomy between criticism and dogmatism
in scientific practice since the 1960s. The core of their discussion regards the necessity to
preserve the stability of science against “permanent (scientific) revolution” whilst at the
same  time,  acknowledging  the  essential  function  played  by  doubt  and  criticism  in
scientific  progress.  Philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn stress the constitutive role of
“normal  science”  in  scientific  practice,  and  affirm  that  criticism  and  doubt  are
appropriate only in exceptional circumstances, which he calls “crises”, the prelude of
revolutions. Popper and the Popperians reply that the development of science consists in
the  falsification  of  attested  theories  and  that  the  suspension  of  doubt  has  negative
consequences for science. The “Popper-Kuhn controversy” is recorded in Criticism and the
Growth of Knowledge (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970), where Kuhn says, for example, that “Sir
Karl  has characterised the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its
occasional revolutionary parts” (Kuhn, 1970:  6).  Popper replies that,  although normal
science  is  a  real  phenomenon,  it  is  also  “a  danger  to  science  and,  indeed  to  our
civilisation” (Popper, 1970: 53). According to Popper, “the normal scientist […] is a person
one ought to be sorry for” (Popper, 1970: 52).
2 As we can see, the question deals with the social structure of science, and the nature of
disagreement within scientific communities. Within what limits can scientists doubt the
methods and results of their activities? It is trivial to say that a state of permanent doubt
is dangerous for science, since it causes uncertainty, which can turn into scepticism and
undermine the trust in scientific institutions (both among the experts and in the public
debate about  science).  On the contrary,  it  is  important  for  scientific  communities  to
defend the stability of knowledge against pathological doubt and scepticism, and I think
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Popper  would  have  agreed  on  this  point.  However,  at  the  same  time,  we  must
acknowledge that the critical discussion of well-confirmed theories is an indispensable
tool  for  the development  of  science.  Therefore,  it  is  useful  to  propose a  model  that
distinguishes between useful doubt and pathological doubt about scientific practice.
3 I do not want to stir up the controversy on scientific dogmatism again, even though I
think it  is less radical than it seems to be.1 Nevertheless,  many actors in this debate
(Popper included) tend to discuss dogmatism as if it is merely a psychological or ethical
attitude of the individual scientist,  whereas I  approach the question from a different
viewpoint. I reconstruct the pragmatist and Wittgensteinian heritage of Kuhn’s concept
of dogmatism in order to clarify its function in scientific practice, and then it should be
clear that both normal science and doubt are useful only from the social perspective of
scientific  communities  and  especially  from  Kuhn’s  analysis  of  the  social  nature  of
scientific  training.  I  argue  that  this  social  dogmatism  accounts  for  the  rejection  of
meaningless doubts, which could harm knowledge, and justify the importance of criticism
for  scientific  progress  by  allowing  us  to  understand  doubt  from  a  communitarian
standpoint.
4 I use a definition of dogmatism different to the common sense one and make a distinction
between ordinary  dogmatism and social  dogmatism (the  concept  I  want  to  endorse)
which reflects the distinction between ordinary scepticism and organised scepticism. By
organised scepticism, the sociologists of science mean that scientific theories should be
tested and challenged by scientific communities. Organised scepticism, regulated by the
norms of scientific method, responds to the precise demand for critical examination of
knowledge: it is institutionalised scepticism (it is meaningful only from the social point of
view of the scientific community and depends on peer judgement) which disqualifies the
indiscriminate  attacks  on  accepted  theories  and  general  knowledge.  This  distinction
opposes the justified institutional scepticism to the personal sceptical attitude. My idea of
social dogmatism is similar to this distinction. Ordinary dogmatism is the overconfident
assertion of opinions and beliefs by an individual, regardless of contrary evidence and
argument. On the contrary, by social dogmatism (from now on “dogmatism”), I mean
blind  (uncritical)  adherence  of  a  community  to  the  “formal”  system  of  norms  and
conventions, which constitutes its practice. It has nothing to do with the personal beliefs
and opinions of individual scientists; rather, it deals with the self-regulation of human
practices  (in  this  case,  scientific  practice),  since  it  self  imposes  the  standard  of
correctness  of  such  practices  and,  in  turn,  the  methodological  criteria  of  organised
scepticism. In the following sections,  I  describe such systems of norm, the respective
adherence, and its foundations, and refer to scientific practice from a Wittgensteinian
and pragmatist point of view.
 
Paradigms and their Normative Structure
5 Since paradigms are the objects of scientific dogmatism, we should clarify them in order
to understand Kuhn’s dogmatism better. In his work following The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions,  he elaborates  the concept  of  paradigm by differentiating its  components.
Since the “Postscript 1969”, we find five elements composing a paradigm:2 1) symbolic
generalisations;  2)  methodological  and  heuristic  models;  3)  metaphysical  models;  4)
scientific values; 5) exemplars. In my argument, I focus on one and five.3
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6 Symbolic generalisations are universal statements, expressed in formal language or easily
formalised and used by the members  of  scientific  communities  “without  question or
dissent”  (Kuhn,  1970:  182).  We compare this  element  with the  hard-core  of  Lakatos’
scientific research programmes. We consider them the natural laws or the fundamental
equation of the paradigm, such as f  = ma o I  = V/R,  although we can express some in
ordinary language (for example the first and third law of Newton’s dynamics).  These
generalisations  allow  scientists  to  deal  with  scientific  theories  as  mathematical
constructions, so they justify the application of logical manipulations. However, symbolic
generalisations do not specify how we apply them to nature.
7 In  fact,  we  express  the  relationship  between  paradigm  and  nature  by  the  most
appropriated meaning of the term paradigm, i.e. exemplary case solution, “the concrete
problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific education,
whether in laboratories,  in examinations,  or at  the end of  chapters in science texts”
(Kuhn, 1970b: 187). As they represent the concrete feature of scientific practice, Kuhn
adds that exemplary problem solutions are the elements, which deeply determine the
social  nature of  scientific  practice,  and the characteristic  agreement within scientific
communities,  an issue I  return to later.  For Kuhn, the empirical  content of  scientific
theories  is  localised  only  in  exemplary  cases.  He  says  that  an  isolated  symbolic
generalisation  is  something  “un-interpreted  […]  empty  of  empirical  meaning  or
application” (Kuhn, 1974: 299).
8 While abstract laws have no meaning, the connection between symbolic generalisation
and exemplary cases constitutes the structure of scientific practice and is a normative
structure. If we take Kuhn’s rejection of the correspondence theory of truth4 and the
comparison  between  Kuhn’s  paradigm  and  Wittgenstein’s  grammars5 for  granted,  it
follows that the paradigms are not descriptive, but normative: “when engaged with a
normal research problem, the scientist must premise current theory as the rules of his
game” (Kuhn, 1970c: 270).6 They do not represent reality or facts and we cannot evaluate
them through their accordance with reality; rather they are norms of representation,
which  determine  a  shared  (by  a  scientific  community)  way  of  describing  reality.7 A
paradigm establishes the limits of meaningful scientific discourse, creates constraints for
experience,  and  excludes  possibilities.8 Kuhn’s  dogmatism  consists  in  the  “blind
obedience” of scientists to the norms dictated by paradigms. In the following sections, I
analyse the features of this obedience.
 
Normativity, Contextuality, Learning
9 It  is  important  to  stress  again that  the normative power of  paradigm resides  in the
exemplary case solutions,  while we can interpret symbolic generalisation in different
ways.  The  relationship  between  symbolic  generalisation  and  exemplary  cases  is
necessarily circular. Exemplary cases are the application of universal laws, but universal
laws are empirically meaningful only if connected to exemplary cases.
The pendulum, the inclined plane, and the rest are examples of f = ma,  and it is
being examples of f = ma that makes them similar, like each other. Without having
been exposed to them or some equivalents as examples of f = ma, students could not
learn to see either the similarities between them or what it was to be a force or a
mass; they could not, that is, acquire the concepts of force and mass or the meaning
of the terms that name them (Kuhn, 1993: 247-8).
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10 Kuhn refers to the difficulties that physics students have when they try to solve the end-
of-chapter exercises in their textbooks, and says that universal laws apply to scientific
practice because students do not learn symbolic generalisation in abstract terms, but by
means  of  exemplary  problem  solutions.  A  paradigm  is  “a  fundamental  scientific
achievement  which  includes  both  a  theory  and  some  exemplary  applications  to  the
results  of  experiment  and observation” (Kuhn,  1963:  358).  Referring to  the  scientific
training experienced by physics students, Kuhn tries to break the circle between the two
elements of the paradigm: the foundation of the normativity of paradigms is pragmatic,
since it rests in scientific practice itself; it subordinates knowledge to practice and action.
11 This  is  the  first  common point  between Kuhn and Wittgenstein.  They  both  adopt  a
pragmatic approach and deflate the problem of the justification of norms saying that
normativity has no metaphysical foundation. A grammar, or a paradigm, regulates the
practice  of  a  community,  but  the  grammar  has  no  foundation  beyond its  practice
(Wittgenstein, 1958: 85). According to Kuhn’s philosophy of science, the concrete
scientific practice corresponds to exemplary case solutions. Kuhn enumerates some of
them and affirms that almost all scientists start their education this way: “the inclined
plane, the conical pendulum, and Keplerian orbits; instruments such as the vernier, the
calorimeter, and the Wheatstone bridge” (Kuhn, 1970: 187). Thanks to these exemplary
cases and to others that students face during training, they learn how to apply symbolic
generalisations in new situations and problematic contexts using analogies with similar
cases:
The student discovers, with or without the assistance of his instructor, a way to see
his  problem  as  like  a  problem  he  has  already  encountered.  Having  seen  the
resemblance, grasped the analogy between two or more distinct problems, he can
inter-relate  symbols  and  attach  them  to  nature  in  the  ways  that  have  proved
effective before (Kuhn, 1970b: 189).
12 Therefore,  the  first  feature  of  scientific  dogmatism  is  its  contextual  nature.  Since
symbolic  generalisations are in themselves  meaningless,  their  normative force is  not
independent  of  the  actual  practices  of  a  scientific  community.  On  the  contrary,  the
meaning of scientific laws is contextually determined if we understand it on the horizon
of a practice. As Wittgenstein said referring to rules, “a norm cannot work only by a
formulation  and  interpretation,  since  we  can  reinterpret  it  in  several  ways”
(Wittgenstein, 1976: 183); the rules acquire their normative content only if connected to
particular practices of application.9 This idea fits well with Kuhn’s interpretation of the
second law of  motion as  analytic  or  quasi-analytic,  or  synthetic  a  priori  proposition
(Kuhn, 1989, 1990):10 roughly, we can interpret the empirical content of Newton’s law in
different ways according to the role we want the law to play in scientific practice and to
which terms we prefer to define empirically. Dogmatism makes possible such forms of
contextual pragmatism, which implies that the ability to apply symbolic generalisations
presumes a practical context, i.e. the consensus of the scientific community. This is a
consensus of action, “a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the same way”
(Wittgenstein, 1976: 183-4). Consensus is only possible thanks to training, since it is what
we need if we want to understand a scientific (or linguistic) practice.
13 The second feature of scientific dogmatism is that it is a social phenomenon grounded in
the relationship of confidence between student and teacher, which allows the student to
join a scientific community. For both Kuhn and Wittgenstein, the agreement in action
depends on the training process that we experience to understand and apply norms. They
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both refer to the pragmatist tradition, which focuses on the concepts of technique and
skill to understand human practices and the structure and acquisition of concepts.11 As
we can see,  since the beginning of  this  essay,  scientists  use symbolic  generalisations
without question or dissent and employ them without allowing for alternatives.  This
attitude is the result of the training they receive, which according to Kuhn, is as rigid as
in orthodox theology (Kuhn, 1970: 166). After all the students can only accept what the
teacher  and textbook present  as  the  truth:  “science students  accept  theories  on the
authority of teacher and text, not because of evidence. What alternatives have they, or
what competence? The applications given in texts are not there as evidence but because
learning them is part of learning the paradigm at the base of current practice” (Kuhn,
1970a: 80). Scientific training is authoritarian and cannot be otherwise since students lack
the competence to evaluate and criticise what they learn. Consequently, the receptive
attitude  of  the  student  (the  blind  acceptance  of  the  authority  of  the  teacher)  is  a
prerequisite of the training. The process is successful if we accept the paradigm as the
way we ought to do things. As will become clear, the paradigm itself partially dictates the
results  of  an experiment and consequently,  if  an experiment goes wrong,  “failure to
achieve a solution discredits only the scientist and not the theory” (Kuhn, 1970a: 80).12
14 Finally, as the third preliminary feature of scientific dogmatism, I can only stress once
again its connection to the social conception of science, i.e., the idea that the subjects of
science are and must be scientific communities and not isolated scientists.13 This feature
is already implicitly and explicitly contained in the second feature, since the learning
process is necessarily a social process. In his comparison between scientific and linguistic
training, Kuhn himself affirms that the acquisition of a (scientific) language is part of the
socialisation  procedure  by  which  we  make  the  scientist  (or  the  child)  part  of  the
community and its world (Kuhn, 1974: 313). Referring to the social nature of paradigm
and dogmatism, Kuhn quotes Wittgenstein again, and specifically refers to his rejection of
the idea of “private language”: “the very idea of scientific knowledge as a private product
presents the same intrinsic problems as the notion of a private language […] neither
knowledge nor language remains the same when conceived as something an individual
can possess and develop alone” (Kuhn, 1970d: 148).14 Clearly, scientists compose scientific
communities,  but  a  scientist  is  only  really  a  scientist  as  a  fellow  of  his  scientific
community, i.e. adherent to the paradigm.15
15 My first conclusion is that we have seen that scientists’ dogmatic attitude towards the
theories  they  support  consists  in  the  acceptance  of  a  social  practice  regulated  by  a
paradigm. We should not explain such an agreement within scientific communities by
referring  to  the  relationship  between  theory  and  reality,  but  rather  find  it  in  the
constitutive role played by scientific training. In the following section, I focus on this
pedagogical foundation of dogmatism.
 
The Foundational Role of Scientific Training
16 In  the  last  section,  we  say  that  the  extraordinary  agreement  within  scientific
communities depends on the common scientific training that scientists experience as
students. Kuhn provides an original interpretation of the relationship between scientific
training  and  scientific  practice  (Warwick  &  Kaiser,  2005).16 First  he  notes  that  the
normative power of paradigms does not rest upon explicit, coercive and inviolable rules,
“the determination of shared paradigms is not, however, the determination of shared
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rules” (Kuhn, 1970a: 43). Sometimes we can abstract explicit rules by scientific practice,
but normal science does not necessarily require an interpretation and rationalisation of
paradigms:  “normal  science  can  be  determined  in  part  by  the  direct  inspection  of
paradigms, a process that is often aided by but does not depend upon the formulation of
rules and assumption” (Kuhn, 1970a: 44). Kuhn refers to Polanyi’s tacit knowledge and
Wittgenstein’s family resemblance and I focus on the latter. In fact, I have just said that,
according to Kuhn,  the practice of  normal science involves the mastery of  similarity
relationships, which allow the scientist to apply the paradigm-model in new problematic
situations.  Those  similarities  and  regularities  in  application  (often  not  expressed  in
explicit propositional form) provide the space to practice normal science, i.e. a space in
which the actions and reactions of scientists agree. The training process entails that the
teacher shapes the student’s reactions, creating a common ground of agreement that we
never  question  except  in  non-normal  circumstances.  The  acquisition  of  concepts
(intended  as  networks  of  similarities)  is  normative  since  the  mastery  of  correct
applications (which requires a “must”) is constitutive of the concept itself.
17 Kuhn’s  most  extended  discussion  of  these  matters  is  from  everyday  experience  of
language  learning  (Kuhn,  1974:  307-19).  He  considers  a  child,  Johnny,  who learns  to
distinguish different kinds of birds (ducks, geese, and swans) under the guidance of his
father, during a walk. The father (who plays the role of the authority and supervisor of
the correct usage in his community) uses ostension, and names the birds at which he
points. When the child tries to do the same and identify the birds, the father validates or
rejects the identification. Thanks to the guidance of his father, and after a certain number
of correct identifications we can say that Johnny is competent in the identification of
birds, ducks, geese, and swans, and that his instruction is successful. After the training
Johnny applies these labels to nature, but he does not use anything like definitions or
correspondence rules: “phrases like ‘all swans are white’ may play a role, but they need
not”  (Kuhn,  1974:  309);  the  child  simply  employs  perception  of  similarities  and
differences. Kuhn’s theory of the elaboration and acquisition of concepts is pragmatic,
which means that the mastery of an empirical concept entails the correct use of the
concept within the appropriate linguistic community (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993: 110).
18 Therefore,  we constitute  the conceptual  structure that  scientists  share by similarity-
difference  classes  associated  to  respective  concepts  without  explicit  definitions  (i.e.
without  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  of  identification).  They  are  family
resemblances, and any scientist can legitimately use different criteria to identify a class,
“in matching terms to their referents one may legitimately make use of anything one
knows or  believes  about  those referents” (Kuhn,  1983:  50).17 Kuhn’s  reference to the
critique of the private language is now clearer. In order to share a language, the members
of  a  scientific  community need not share definitions or criteria of  identification and
application.  What  commensurable  languages  must  preserve  is  only  the  structure  of
similarities and differences, which Kuhn calls “taxonomic or lexical structure”, since the
eighties:
What members of a language community share is homology of lexical structure.
Their criteria need not be the same, for those they can learn from each other as
needed.  But  their  taxonomic  structures  must  match,  for  where  structure  is
different,  the world is  different,  language is  private,  and communication ceases
until one party acquires the language of the other; (Kuhn, 1983: 52)
19 Scientific training allows scientists to enter a scientific community whose practice we
regulate by norms implicit in the lexical structure they acquire as students, and which
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“mirrors” aspects of the world it describes (and limits the phenomena described by the
same lexicon).18 This  observation leads to a second feature of  scientific  training that
relates  to  the  role  played  by exemplary  problem solutions  in  the  acquisition  of  the
paradigm.
20 Together with the absence of explicit rules, there is a second important aspect of the
relationship between scientific training and scientific practice. Kuhn draws attention to
the difficulties faced by physics students to apply the physical laws presented in their
textbooks (whose meaning they believed they had grasped perfectly) to solve the relative
end-of-chapter  exercises  (Kuhn,  1970b:  179).  Grasping  the  meaning  of  physical  laws
requires not only reflection on the structure of the laws themselves, but also the use of
canonical  exemplary  solutions,  which  the  scientific  community  considers  correct.  A
consequence of this is that we reverse the relationship between exercises and laws. The
normativity  of  paradigms  lies  in  their  exemplary  nature.  Therefore  we  do  not  use
examples just to illustrate whether the student understands the lesson and the meaning
of the terms that recur in physical laws; rather, examples generate the meaning of the
same laws. Understanding is not a matter of adequate mental representations, it is the
ability to use pre-existing solutions and examples to find a solution to new problems by
means of new applications and articulations of the old terms. We do not define Newtonian
concepts  such as  “force” or  “mass”  by the laws of  motion,  but  by the experimental
situation associated with such laws (for example the model of the inclined plane) (Kuhn,
1993: 147-8).
21 A consequence of this approach is that learning by means of examples is important not
only to create common patterns of perception and action within scientific communities,
but also to institute the connection between scientific language and reality. Training can
(pragmatically) “found” normal science because it teaches students how to do things with
language; once again, Kuhn follows Wittgenstein and emphasises that the meaning of
scientific  terms  consists  in  their  use  in  scientific  practice.  We  learn  the  words  that
constitute a lexical structure in use, which implies that we acquire knowledge of language
and knowledge of the world together:
Someone already adept in their use [of the scientific words] provides the learner
with  examples  of  their  proper  application.  Several  such  exposures  are  always
required, and their outcome is the acquisition of more than one concept. By the
time the learning process has been completed, the learner has acquired knowledge
not only of the concepts but also of the properties of the world to which they apply.
(Kuhn, 1993: 230)
22 Just  like  in  language  games  where  there  are  inextricably  linked  linguistic  and  non-
linguistic features, scientific training in paradigms is a nature-language learning (Kuhn,
1970c: 167), in relation to which, Kuhn explicitly speaks of “learning language and nature
together” (Kuhn, 1970c: 171).19 As Wittgenstein says “the connection between words and
things is set up by the teaching of language” (Wittgenstein, 1974: 97) and this kind of
correlation is “simply the one set up by a chart, by ostensive gestures and simultaneous
uttering of the name” (ibid). I return later to the role played by ostension in scientific
training, but now I draw your attention to a consequence of the foundation of paradigms
by means of  learning by example.  The lexical  structure  of  scientific  language is  not
something we can create abstractly and attach to reality;20 rather,  Kuhn explains the
connection between language and nature using the image of coinage with two faces: “the
criteria relevant to categorisation are ipso facto the criteria that attach the names of
those categories to the world. Language is a coinage with two faces, one looking outward
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to the world, the other inward to the world’s reflection in the referential structure of the
language” (Kuhn, 1981: 30).
23 Before I analyse two characteristic features of scientific training (ostension and the use of
textbooks), I summarise the role of learning from previous reflections:21
a. Scientific training allows physics students to adhere to a social practice, characterised by a
set of normative regularities, although we do not express these regularities by explicit and
coercive norms.
b. Training requires a context whose background consents to the norms of the paradigm to be
meaningful.  The  qualified  teacher  (the  representative  of  the  authority  of  a  scientific
community)  provides  this  context:  he  approves  or  invalidates  the  behaviours  of  the
students.
c. Just  like every  normative  practice  (a  practice  which  asks  for  norms,  standards,  rules),
scientific practice is necessarily social.  We cannot consider a solitary man who does not
support a paradigm a scientist, or, as Kuhn says, the results of his activity are something less
than science.
d. The use  of  scientific  concepts  presupposes  the  mastery  of  their  relative  techniques  and
skills, but we cannot formalise such techniques and skills in a set of propositional norms,
definitions,  and  rules  of  correspondence.  The  ultimate  foundation  of  paradigms  is
pragmatic; it rests on scientific practice itself.
e. The general agreement pertaining to scientific communities (i.e. the fact that scientists do
not usually question the basic elements of their discipline) originates from their adherence
to  the  common  patterns  of  behaviour  and  perception  (networks  of  similarities  and
differences) acquired during training. Scientific dogmatism is grounded in the grammatical
structure of paradigms.
 
Ostension and Ostensive Learning
Both Kuhn and Wittgenstein emphasise the role of ostension in the acquisition of a new
(scientific)  language;  however,  this  idea  requires  clarification.  Kuhn  says  that  the
exposition to examples of ostension is indispensable to understanding some scientific
terms by direct application. It is part of the previously outlined process of contemporary
acquisition  of  knowledge  of  language  and  nature.  The  objects  involved  in  ostensive
learning are not language-independent at all: just because we capture them by scientific
practice,  they  have  become,  in  Wittgenstein’s  words,  “part  of  the  symbolism”  or
“samples.”22 Clearly, this does not mean that ostension can fix the meaning of a word or
generate a standard for future applications, or that ostensive definitions are adequate
descriptions of the meaning of scientific terms. In Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language,
ostensive teaching (Wittgenstein, 1958: 4-5) plays the function of ostensive definition.
This is to say the part of the training connected to the practice and context in which we
embody  the  expression,  helps  the  student  to  understand  the  use  of  a  word  and  to
establish a connection between language and things.23
Kuhn also acknowledges that ostensive definitions are not enough to fix the meaning of
the words and distinguishes between “ostension” and “ostensive”:
The terms “ostension” and “ostensive” seem to have two different uses, which for
present purposes needs to be distinguished. In one, these terms imply that nothing
but the exhibit of a word’s referent is needed to learn or to define it. In the other,
they imply only that some exhibit is required during the acquisition process. I shall,
of course, be using the second sense of the terms. (Kuhn, 1989: 13)
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24 Kuhn’s emphasis on ostension depends on his concept of learning through examples. He
wants to reaffirm that we do not learn scientific language regardless of the concrete use,
and that  ostensive  learning  is  an  important  part,  although only  a  part,  of  scientific
training. While the use of everyday words such as “swan”, “duck” and “goose” can create
misunderstanding and induce the idea that the meaning of these terms is established by
means of the ostensive act, the use of scientific terms immediately clarifies the question:
Pointing to a galvanometer needle while supplying the name of the cause of its
deflection attaches the name only to  the cause of  that  particular  deflection (or
perhaps  to  an  unspecified  subset  of  galvanometer  deflections).  It  supplies  no
information at all about the many other sorts of events to which the name ‘electric
charge’ also unambiguously refers. (Kuhn, 1979: 199)
25 Finally, referring to complex scientific terms, such as “electric charge”, it is evident that
Kuhn does not support the existence of ostensive definitions, but rather wants to stress
the role of ostensive learning in the determination of the network of similarities and
differences which constitutes the structure of scientific lexicon.
 
The Authority of Scientific Textbooks
26 In parallel with the relationship between teacher and students, Kuhn often notices that
scientific  textbooks  represent  the  social  authority  of  scientific  communities  in  the
training process. From the first page of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he says that
the most common image of science derives from textbooks and from their pedagogical
and persuasive power (Kuhn, 1970a: 1). Just as in ostensive learning, scientific textbooks
also support the authoritative nature of the training: “readers of current science text
accept the theories there expounded on the authority of the author and the scientific
community” (Kuhn, 1961: 182-3), and not because they have experimentally tested such
theories. In fact, Kuhn affirms that the experimental evidence presented in science texts
almost has a pedagogical function, that is to say, they are exemplary solutions that enable
an adequate understanding of the physical laws and their practical application. He refers
to them as parts of a “context of pedagogy”, different to both the context of discovery
and the context of justification (Kuhn, 1977b: 327).
27 The context of pedagogy represented by science texts corresponds to the anti-historical
and dogmatic attitude that Kuhn sees in scientific training. He points out that the most
singular  feature  of  scientific  training  is  that  we  introduce  science  students  to  their
respective discipline only through textbooks,  while other students are encouraged to
read the classics in their fields (Kuhn, 1963: 350). In contrast to other disciplines, the
difference in alternative textbooks is mainly for technical and pedagogical details, but all
display the same approach to their problem-fields (Kuhn, 1963: 350-1). This is because, in
order to develop its characteristic dogmatism, scientific pedagogy voluntarily refuses a
historical approach to its matter,24 which is not a criticism of scientific learning: science
would probably not be possible without such ideas, a point I will return to. The question
is  to  distinguish  between  the  context  of  pedagogy  and  the  history  of  science  (and
therefore the contexts of discovery and justification).25
28 The  reference  to  the  typical  organisation  of  scientific  knowledge  in  science  texts
according to the order of pedagogy highlights another aspect of scientific dogmatism:
textbooks represent the product of the institutionalised scientific practice, i.e.  a social
self-authenticating  practice  that  “justifies”  the  normativity  of  paradigms.26 The
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institutional structure of science, that is to say its social organisation through training,
textbooks, scientific communities and so on, is a precondition for the organisation of
meaningful  scientific  discourse.  This  is  the  nature  of  the  paradigm,  it  creates  and
constrains the possibility of scientific practice. What is important for dogmatism is not
the  acceptance  of  particular  beliefs,  but  the  adherence  to  the  “formal”  normative
structure of the paradigm. We can only consider what we learn in certain ways and from
certain books approved by scientific communities to be scientific knowledge.27
 
Dogmatism: A New Place for Doubt and Critique
29 Dogmatism is not the scientists’ psychological and ethical attitude towards the theories
they work on, or the unjustified conviction in certain specified beliefs. It might be this
way only if the paradigm is a conceptual schemes or a systems of propositions we believe
to be true, but I argue that paradigms have nothing to do with the personal beliefs of
scientists. On the contrary, paradigms have no descriptive nature, but rather a normative
one,  they  are  networks  of  rules  for  the  production  and  organisation  of  scientific
knowledge, i.e. of a set of consistent statements that we verify or falsify by means of
experimental practice. Dogmatism does not refer to a system of beliefs, but to a system of
norms, not to the specific content of knowledge but to the way scientific communities
authenticate, organise, and transmit scientific knowledge. Although the way we organise
knowledge  inevitably  influences  the  possible  content  of  such  knowledge  (and  so  a
distinction  between  formal  and  material  aspects  of  knowledge  is  not  satisfactory),
paradigms are roughly, in a Kantian attitude, the formal matrix of our knowledge or a
matrix for the construction of knowledge.
30 This is clear from referring to the interpretation of scientific changes. Let me concede for
a moment, for the sake of the argument, the hypothesis that dogmatism is a psychological
attitude  of  the  individual  scientist  (or,  as  Popper  says,  a  dangerous  lack  of  critical
approach).  This  hypothesis  does  not  explain  correctly,  for  example,  the  distinction
between normal and revolutionary change in the history of science. In fact, one should
not take the difference between normal and revolutionary science too literally and think
that the characteristics of the former are completely opposite to the ones of the latter.28
Normal science is not a totally crystallised practice and it allows transformations and
adjustments, which are sometimes substantial.  According to the psychological-ethical-
individualist interpretation of dogmatism, (the scientist irrationally clings to his ideas
and  beliefs)  we  can  interpret  every  change  as  revolutionary,  since  it  requires  a
suspension of the dogmatic attitude. Kuhn tries to elaborate a more complex theory of
revolutionary  change  by  means  of  the  distinction between the  empirical  features  of
scientific  theories  (the  paradigm  broadly  speaking,  as  system  of  beliefs)  and  the
normative features (the paradigm strictly speaking, as system of norms). A revolutionary
change involves the normative backbone of scientific practice in depth, it is a substitution
for the rules of the game:29
The problem of distinguishing between a core and an extended core has a close
counterpart in my own work: the problem of distinguishing between normal and
revolutionary  change.  I  have  here  and  there  used  the  term  “constitutive”  in
discussing  that  problem  too,  suggesting  that  what  must  be  discarded  during  a
revolutionary change is somehow a constitutive, rather than simply a contingent,
part, or the previous theory. The difficulty, then, is to find ways to unpacking the
term “constitutive”.  My closest  approach to  solution,  still  a  mere aperçu,  is  the
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suggestion that constitutive elements are in some sense quasi-analytic, i.e. partially
determined by the language in which nature is discussed rather than by nature tout
court. (Kuhn, 1976: 187)
31 From the outset, we can see the role of scientific dogmatism links to the idea that some
sections  of  scientific  theories  (“analytic,  quasi-analytic  or  synthetic  a  priori”
propositions,  i.e. the  symbolic  generalisations  connected  to  their  applications  in
exemplary case solutions) behave as constitutive (and at least partially implicit) rules of
scientific practice. These rules allow scientists to produce empirical propositions, open to
criticism,  doubt  and empirical  falsification,  whereas,  dogmatism deals  with the blind
adherence to the rules of scientific practice.30
32 Therefore,  we  do  not  intend  the  agreement  within  scientific  communities  to  be
conventionalist or relativist. It does not mean that what is true (or false) is the result of
the conventional decision of the specialists and from that moment forward, we consider
the  result  of  such  decisions  unquestionable.  Just  like  in  Wittgenstein’s  famous
affirmation, that is “not an agreement in opinion, but in forms of life”31 (Wittgenstein,
1958: 88) or “a consensus of action” (Wittgenstein, 1976: 183-4).32 The paradigms do not
determine the truth, but the way scientists critically evaluate, discuss, test and challenge
truths.  Finally,  Kuhn’s  dogmatism  reveals  a  similarity  with  Wittgenstein’s  and
pragmatists’  conception of certainty,  where accepting a proposition as certain means
using it  as  a  grammatical  rule.33 An important point  in this  comparison is  that  both
dogmatism and certainty are preconditions for meaningful doubts. In fact, when Kuhn
enumerates  the  advantages  of  scientific  dogmatism,  along  with  the  elimination  of
scepticism and pointless doubts, he says that scientists can recognise the failures and the
problems of their theory only by referring to the background provided by the paradigm:
The practitioners of mature sciences know with considerable precision what sort of
result he should gain from his research. As a consequence, he is in a particularly
favourable position to recognise when a research problem has gone astray. […] The
practice  of  normal  puzzle-solving  science  can  and  inevitably  does  lead  to  the
isolation and recognition of anomaly. That recognition proves, I think, prerequisite
for  almost  all  discoveries  of  new  sorts  of  phenomena  and  for  all  fundamental
innovations in scientific theory. (Kuhn, 1963: 364-5)
33 This  is  what  Kuhn  calls  the  “essential  tension”  in  scientific  research  (Kuhn,  1959).
Scientific progress needs divergent and convergent thought, dogmatism and criticism,
but  we can understand the combined presence of  these elements  only from a social
standpoint that acknowledges the centrality of scientific communities in the explanation
of scientific development. Both dogmatism and criticism are meaningful only as social
phenomena.
34 Consequently, dogmatism leaves space for criticism, except when it is necessary to avoid
ceaseless scientific revolutions and theory changes that threaten scientific progress. It
only safeguards the normative backbone of scientific theories from scepticism, saving
this structure from the possibility of empirical falsification. Normally it involves only a
few interrelated terms and laws, such as “mass”, “force”, “weight”, the laws of motion
etc., in Newton’s physics. Except for this backbone, scientific assertions produced and
organised through it, are subject to criticism, doubt, and rational discussion by means of
the classical tools of experience, logic, evidence, persuasion and so on. These tools help
scientists to determine what is true (and what is false), although obviously any theory
choice involves decisional and fallible features. The paradigms (i.e. the things that shape
scientific dogmatism) deal with the determination of what can or cannot be empirically
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35 In my paper, I  argue that, in a scientific context, the distinction between meaningful
doubt (which is positive for scientific progress) and pathological doubt (which turns into
scepticism) is clear only from a social point of view about the nature of science and the
organisation of scientific communities. Social dogmatism and organised scepticism are
complementary concepts. On the one hand, organised scepticism guarantees the safety of
scientific  knowledge  from  sceptical  and  iconoclastic  attacks,  since  it  states  that  we
regulate scientific doubt institutionally according to methods, criteria, and procedures
established at the level of communities and subject to peer judgement. On the other hand,
social  dogmatism fixes the accepted methods,  criteria and the procedures to practice
science,  and in turn,  to exercise doubt and critical  thinking.  I  stress again that such
methods,  criteria,  and  procedures  are  “formal  concepts”:  they  do  not  deal  with  the
content of scientific knowledge, but with the organisation and production of scientific
knowledge. They do not influence the truth, but the way scientists critically evaluate,
discuss, test and challenge truths. In a scientific context, both dogmatism and scepticism
are, at the same time, both dangerous and necessary. This does not mean that scientists
should be simultaneously dogmatic and sceptical; rather, it means that certainty and non-
pathological doubts emerge at the institutional level of scientific communities.
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NOTES
1. For a recent reconstruction of the debate between Popper and Kuhn, see Worrall (2003).
2. Or, better, a disciplinary matrix. See Kuhn (1970b: 175).
3. For a more extended treatment of the elements of a disciplinary matrix and their mutual
relationships, see Hoyningen-Huene (1993: 145-59).
4. Bird (2000: 209-66).
5. Malone (1993); Glock (1996: 215); Sharrock, Read (2002: 162-3); Baltas (2004).
6. See  also  Kuhn  (1970a:  52),  where  he  used  the  expression  “set  of  rules”  to  describe  the
paradigm. 
7. As we will see in the following sections, this is not a form of instrumentalism which affirms
that  science  has  nothing  to  do  with  reality.  The  falsification  or  verification  of  empirical
assertions depends on nature, but it is possible only taking for granted the practical horizon
provided by the paradigm: paradigms are contitutive rules (for Kuhn’s kantism, see Hoyningen-
Huene 1993, and Irzik & Grünberg 1998) which enable scientific practice. 
8. “Here I cannot analyze in depth the normativity of paradigms. I recall an example by Kuhn
himself: Dalton’s law according to which atoms could only combine one-to-one or in some other
simple whole number ratio. According to Kuhn it is not a true statement about the world, but,
rather,  it  limits  the  field  of  meaningful  propositions  in  chemistry:  [It  did]  enable  him  to
determine the sizes and weights of elementary particles, but it also made the law of constant
proportion a tautology. For Dalton, any reaction in which the ingredients did not enter in fixed
proportion was ipso facto not a purely chemical process. A law that experiment could not have
established before Dalton's work, became, once that work was accepted, a constitutive principle
that no single set of chemical measurements could have upset.” (Kuhn, 1970a: 135). 
9. See Medina (2002: 141-94) with reference to Wittgenstein contextualism.
10. On this matter Kuhn himself quotes Wittgesntein: Kuhn (1989: 72).
11. See for example Brandom (1994: 362 ff).
12. Wittgenstein says something consistent with this idea referring to arithmetical calculus. In
fact it does not accept alternative results. If the result of a calculus is different of the attended
one, you would say that “I must have made a mistake; the same kind of way would always have to
produce the same result” (Wittgenstein, 1978: 70). This reply shows the mastery of a technique
because  “you  are  incorporating  the  result  of  the  transformation  into  the  kind  of  way  the
transforming is done” (ibid.). 
13. For Kuhn, history and sociology of science are not variables which influence science from
outside; rather science is essentially a social and historical enterprise (Kuhn, 1970c: 129-30). 
14. See also Kuhn (1983: 52).
15. This reference to the critique of private language explain also a seemingly strange sentence
from The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: “Anyone examining a survey of physical optics before
Newton may well conclude that, though the field practitioners were scientists, the net result of
their activity was something less than science” (Kuhn, 1970a: 13).  The idea is that the public
nature of paradigm pre-exists to the subjectivity of scientists and founds it. Moreover the social
nature of  science is  emphasized also by the comparison between scientific  communities  and
biological  species.  If  scientific  progress can be compared with Darwinian evolution,  then the
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main  characters  of  scientific  progress  are  not  individual  scientists,  but  rather  scientific
communities. Kuhn develops this idea in his Kuhn (1991). 
16. For  other  discussions  of  Thomas  Kuhn’s  pedagogy  of  science,  see  Andersen  (2000b)  and
Barnes (1982: 16-40). 
17. See also Kuhn (1974: 307): “It is a truism that anything is similar to, and also different from,
anything else. It depends, we usually say, on the criteria. To the man who speaks of similarity or
of analogy, we therefore at once pose the question: similar with respect to what? In this case,
however, that is just the question that must not be asked, for an answer would at once provide us
with correspondence rules.” For a discussion of Kuhn’s conception of family resemblances and its
differences with Wittgenstein’s theory see Andersen (2000a). 
18. The question of the relationship between paradigms and the world in Kuhn’s philosophy of
science is too much complex and discussed to be analyzed here. Therefore I refer to Hacking
(1993), Hoyningen-Huene (1993), Sankey (1997).
19. On  this  matter  Wittgenstein  described  some facts  as  “fused  into  the  foundations  of  our
language-game” (Wittgenstein, 1969: 73).
20. See Wittgenstein (1974: 89).
21. This  summary  is  an  adaptation  of  Meredith  Williams’s  presentation  of  Wittgenstein’s
language learning theory to Kuhn’s ideas about scientific learning (Williams, 1999: 214-5)
22. This means that the objects of ostensive learning begin playing a normative role to fix the
meaning of some terms in their respective language-games.
23. For a distinction between ostensive definition and ostensive teaching, see Williams (1999: 21).
24. For example, the historical approach characterizes disciplines such as philosophy or arts. 
25. Auguste Comte had already noted that the chronological order of scientific discoveries does
not  coincide  with  the  actual  organization  of  knowledge.  Communicating  and  teaching  the
achievements of science require a certain reconstruction which produces a new order of the
arguments and their mutual relationship (Comte called it “the dogmatic order”) different of the
order of discovery and justification (“the historical order”). Moreover on this matter, another
predecessor of Kuhn is Gaston Bachelard, who has emphasized the role of textbook for scientific
pedagogy  and  focused  especially  on  their  normative  and  social  function.  For  a  comparison
between Comte, Bachelard and Kuhn on scientific pedagogy and textbooks see García-Belmar,
Bertomeu-Sánchez, Bensaude-Vincent (2005: 219-22). As a final point, the philosopher of science
who is closer to Kuhn in the analysis of scientific training is Ludwik Fleck; in fact he studied the
authoritative and dogmatic nature of scientific learning and related it to the use of textbooks,
intended as the principal instrument of that “indoctrination” (see Cederbaum, 1983: 195-6). 
26. I have already sketched the social and normative nature of paradigms. Now I shortly describe
their self-authentication: 1) the same experience-field can be often fixed by different paradigms
(Kuhn, 1970a:76); 2) no paradigm can be said “grounded or justified by experience” (Kuhn, 1970a:
146-8).  This is a common point between Kuhn’s paradigms and Wittgenstein’s grammar: they
both can be justified only by a pragmatic point of view, since their normativity imposes the
standards for their own justification (Kuhn, 1970a: 109-10). 
27. Wittgenstein says that we believe scientific facts because they are transmitted to us “in a
certain manner” (Wittgenstein, 1969: 24-5) and that in general we take as true “what is find in
the textbooks” (Wittgenstein,  1969:  23).  Finally  we have no ground for trusting textbooks of
experimental physics (Wittgenstein, 1969: 79).
28. Kuhn admits that in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions he himself had overly emphasized
the normal-revolutionary science distinction and that if he were rewriting his book I would focus
less on such distinction (Kuhn, 1983: 57).
29. Kuhn (1989: 72). 
30. Of course, the distinction between empirical and normative propositions is not so sharp: it is
not  grounded in the empirical  reality.  Just  like Wittgenstein,  Kuhn does not  distinguish two
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different kinds of proposition, but two different uses. The same proposition can be in certain
circumstances  an  empirical  proposition  which  we  can  test  by  experience  and,  in  other
circumstances, a normative proposition which we use as rule of testing (Wittgenstein, 1969: 15);
but it cannot be at the same time an empirical and normative proposition. 
31. In order to avoid the conventionalist problems related to the word “agreement”, Stanley
Cavell  proposes  to  translate  Wittgenstein’s  German  word  Übereinstimmung with  the  English
“attunement” and not with the traditional “agreement”. That is because “the idea of agreement
here is not that of coming to or arriving at an agreement on a given occasion, but of being in
agreement throughout, being in harmony, like pitches or tones, or clocks, or weighing scales, or
columns of figures” (Cavell,  1978:  32).  Cavell  and Kuhn worked together at  the University of
Berkley and Cavell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein could have been an important influence in
Kuhn’s understanding of the Austrian philosopher (see Kindi, 2010). 
32. This reference to the agreement in action as an agreement in forms of life explains also a
statements of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions which could be misunderstood. Kuhn wrote
that  the  choice  between  competing  paradigms  “proves  to  be  a  chose  between  incompatible
modes of social life” (Kuhn 1970a: 94). This idea could look like a relativist affirmation about the
incomparability of scientific theories, together with an underestimation (or an exaltation) of the
intolerance towards different ideas. Instead he says just that different paradigms correspond to
different models of social action and, in the end, to different forms of life,  but this does not
involve considerations about relativism or intolerance. 
33. Clearly this is closely related to the role played by such proposition in the learning process
(Wittgenstein, 1969: 62). 
34. See Hacking (1982) for a distinction between true-or-false statements and statements which
are not candidates for truth-or-falsehood; this idea has already been applied to Kuhn’s paradigms
by Wang in his Wang (2002).
ABSTRACTS
In  the  traditional  debate  on  the  dichotomy  between  dogmatism  and  criticism  in  scientific
practice (the Popper-Kuhn debate), dogmatism is considered a psychological or ethical attitude
of the individual scientist. In this paper, I propose a new interpretation of scientific dogmatism
by means of a reconstruction of the pragmatist and Wittgensteinian heritage of Kuhn’s concept
of dogmatism. My thesis is that such a revised concept accounts for both the stability of scientific
knowledge (against scepticism and ceaseless scientific revolutions), and the importance of doubt
and criticism for scientific progress. This is possible only if we consider dogmatism from a social
perspective that focuses on scientific communities as the main actors in the history of science.
From this point of view, dogmatism is not the unjustified acceptance of particular beliefs, but the
blind adherence to  the “formal”  normative structure of  the paradigm.  I  argue that  we have
grounded this normative structure in the training process that physics students experience in
their formative years,  and that Kuhn describes in a similar way to Wittgenstein’s analysis of
general  linguistic  training.  Finally,  dogmatism does not refer to a system of beliefs,  but to a
system  of  norms;  not  to  the  specific  content  of  knowledge  but  to  the  way  that  scientific
knowledge  is  authenticated,  organised,  and  transmitted  by  scientific communities.  The
institutional structure of science, that is to say its social organisation trough training, textbooks,
scientific communities and so on, is a precondition for the organisation of meaningful scientific
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discourse  (i.e.  for  the  production  and  organisation  of  empirically  verifiable  or  falsifiable
statements).  That is the nature of the paradigm: it  creates and constrains the possibilities of
scientific practice. In normal circumstances, dogmatism and certainty are concerned with such
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